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Abstract 
‘Flexicurity’ might be defined as a mix of flexible contractual arrangements, 
income support measures, active labour market policies and lifelong learning. 
The successful shift in approach of the Danish and Dutch labour markets from 
passive to active labour market policies, and to flexicurity, has attracted 
considerable attention among academics and policy-makers.  
The objective of this Working Document is to contribute to the debate with the 
creation of a composite indicator to measure flexicurity,  based on the definition 
provided in the European Commission’s Communication on Flexicurity 
(COM(2007)359). Our indicator confirms that preferences in the balance of 
flexibility and security are highly heterogeneous among countries; a finding that 
supports the ‘pathway’ approach as proposed by the European Commission.  
A second important conclusion is that the idea of flexibility being in favour of 
employers and security being in favour of employees needs to be overcome. 
Flexicurity is ‘both for both’, although it does not apply uniformly to all age 
groups but is two and three times greater for older and younger workers 
respectively. 
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BEYOND FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY 
A COMPOSITE INDICATOR OF FLEXICURITY 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 329/MAY 2010 
ILARIA MASELLI
* 
1. The  background 
The so-called knowledge society, with the increasing importance of human capital, the level of 
educational attainment and innovation as the key drivers of growth and competitiveness, offers 
many new opportunities, but also places new demands on the adaptability and mobility of both 
employers and employees. A high level of education provides the individual citizen with a basic 
capacity to adapt flexibly to new conditions and to change easily from one job and one branch 
to another.  
In fact, about 10% of jobs change occupant every year on average in the EU, implying that in a 
single year one person in ten will be seeking a job, or for ways of acquiring new skills, but will 
also be exposed to the stress inevitably associated with the increasing speed and frequency of 
transition in the new globalising economy. In this environment, even persons with a high level 
of education and, even more so, persons with lighter educational baggage increasingly need 
systematic information on opportunities as well as financial and administrative support in order 
to both stimulate and facilitate adaptability and acquire the new skills required for successful 
transition.  
Among the EU member states, Denmark has for some time, in addition to ‘passive’ 
unemployment insurance schemes, provided active assistance to unemployed people in search 
of a job. The Netherlands, however, stands out in this respect with an example of an important 
change in the orientation of labour market policy in the 1990s, in particular with the adoption of 
a “Flexibility and Security Bill” that came into force on 1 January 1999. This shift in policy, 
combining in the same bill measures aimed at boosting flexibility and income security, 
presented as a significant shift in policy from protecting ‘jobs’ towards protecting 
‘employment’, in fact also gave rise to the concept of ‘flexicurity’. 
The significant shift in labour market policy in the Netherlands led to a remarkable increase in 
its employment rate. As shown in Figure 1, the rate of employment in the Netherlands, which 
from 1966 to 1990 had closely followed that of the EU average, took off in 1991 and, over the 
next fifteen years, climbed steeply upwards. By 2008, consequently, the Netherlands had 
reached the Danish employment rate; providing a striking illustration of the potential of a shift 
in the orientation of labour market policy. 
An interesting aspect of Dutch employment policy is also its emphasis on measures to facilitate 
and promote part-time and temporary employment. As a result, the rise in the overall rate of 
employment in the Netherlands has also been accompanied by a remarkable rise in part-time 
employment, making it easier for women (especially) to combine child-rearing and continued 
participation in the labour market, thereby assuring a high degree of maintenance of human 
capital. 
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Figure 1. Employment in percent of working-age population 
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Source: Eurostat. 
Recognising that public policy may have a role to play in assisting the individual worker and the 
enterprise in ensuring a smooth and efficient functioning of the labour market, several decades 
ago Sweden and Denmark introduced mechanisms with this aim in mind. At the level of the 
European Union, in 1997 the European Council underlined the potential for using Active 
Labour Market Policies (ALMP) to boost employment and combat unemployment. 
It is therefore not surprising that these experiences have attracted considerable interest among 
other EU member states and that, at the level of the EU, the concept of ‘flexicurity’ has gained 
prominence both politically and scientifically. Major steps towards a more explicit application 
of this concept at the level of the EU were taken in July 2006 with the creation of the European 
Expert Group on Flexicurity, the publication of the report by the group in June 2007,
1 the 
Communication from the Commission of July 2007
2 and, more recently, an Employment 
Committee (EMCO) report on monitoring and analysing flexicurity policies.
3 
As indicated in the EMCO report (page 2) the Commission and the member states have in fact 
reached a consensus that flexicurity policies can be designed and implemented across four 
policy components. The four components are: 
•  Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements (from the perspective of the employer and 
the employee, of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’) through modern labour laws, collective 
agreements and work organisation; 
•  Comprehensive lifelong learning (LLL) strategies to ensure the continual adaptability and 
employability of workers, particularly those most vulnerable; 
•  Effective active labour market policies (ALMP) that can help people cope with rapid 
change, reduce unemployment spells and ease transitions to new jobs; 
                                                      
1 Flexicurity Pathways: Turning hurdles into stepping stones, Report by the European Expert Group on 
Flexicurity, June 2007.  
2 European Commision, DG EMPL, Unit D2, Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and 
better jobs through flexibility and security, July 2007. 
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•  Modern social security systems that provide adequate income support, encourage 
employment and facilitate labour market mobility. This includes broad coverage of social 
protection provisions (unemployment benefits, pensions and health care) that help people 
combine work with private and family responsibilities, such as child care. 
With the aim of producing a more comprehensive and condensed assessment of the degree of 
flexicurity achieved by the different member states and the relations with other aspects of 
employment performance, this Working Document presents a first attempt to produce a 
composite indicator for flexicurity. The advantage of a composite indicator is, in fact, two-fold: 
•  It allows an easily accessible overall estimate of the level of achievement in this field; and 
•  It facilitates quantitative and econometric analysis of the correlations, both within the set of 
indicators chosen and between the composite indicator and other indicators of economic 
performance. 
2.  The construction of the index 
The composite indicator presented below assembles input and outcome indicators that constitute 
a measurement of the following elements that, according to the EC Communication “Towards 
Common Principles of Flexicurity” (2007) are the main features of a flexicurity system: 
o  Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements; 
o  Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies to keep the labour force updated in line with the 
demands of companies; 
o  Effective active labour market policies to ease the transition to new jobs; 
o  Modern social security systems that provide income support and family facilities. 
Input indicators quantify information on legislation and institutions that bear on certain aspect 
of flexicurity. As summarised in Table 1, the flexibility interim indicator is based on the 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index produced by the OECD. Admittedly this 
choice attributes a considerable weight to this indicator, but examination of the alternatives 
suggests both that other input indicators, such as the World Bank index of the facility of doing 
business, on the one hand, is relatively well correlated with the OECD’s EPL indicator and, on 
the other, includes features that do not directly concern the labour market. On the ‘security’ side 
of flexicurity, the choice of indicators is more comprehensive and the interim indicator proposed 
here is based on an average of the three features indicated in the table: the OECD indicator of 
net replacement rates for income security, government expenditure per (unemployed) capita for 
ALMP and the percentage of the population that undertook training for lifelong learning. It is 
important that the overall composite flexicurity indicator gives equal weight to the flexibility 
and the security sides and this despite the fact that more indicators are used on the security side. 
Outcome indicators assess the extent to which each sub-indicator achieves its objectives. The 
outcome sub-indicator selected for the flexibility side is job tenure, which measures the length 
of time a worker stays in his or her current job. As far as security is concerned, the risk of 
poverty fills the category of income protection, while the share of long-term unemployment in 
total employment indicates the success rate of ALMP: the lower the share, the more successful 
activation is. No outcome indicator is available for lifelong learning.  4 | ILARIA MASELLI 
Table 1. Sub-indicators 
Source: Own elaboration. 
In order to have easily comparable output, all data are normalised. As a consequence also the 
indicator has minimum and maximum values of 0 and 1 respectively, where a value close to 1 
corresponds to a perfect flexicurity regime. Figure 2 shows the ranking of each country for 
which data are available.  
Figure 2. The Flexicurity Index: Input and outcome 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
3.  Analysis of the results 
3.1  Cross-country comparative analysis 
A cross-country comparative analysis of input indicators reveals that different member states 
have completely different preferences for the balance between flexibility and security, as well as 
for the balance between active and passive labour market policies.  
  INPUT   OUTCOME     
 
Flexibility 
 
EPL Index by OECD  Job tenure 
 
Flexibility 
Income security 
OECD indicator of average of net 
replacement rates over 60 months of 
unemployment 
Risk of poverty 
Active labour 
market policies 
Government expenditure per unemployed 
person (corrected by GDP per capita) 
Long-term 
unemployment 
Lifelong learning  Percentage of population that had training 
in the 4 previous weeks  n.a. 
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Some of the results sketched in Figure 2 are perfectly in line with expectations: Denmark 
registers the highest score and the top five also include Sweden and the Netherlands. The 
opposite side of the chart shows Mediterranean countries. What is more surprising is the 
performance of the UK and Ireland. The interim indicators for flexibility and security, 
illustrated in Figure 3, help to unveil the mystery: both Anglo-Saxon countries have very high 
levels of flexibility, as one would imagine, but on the other hand, also show a decent score on 
the security side (0.5/1).  
Figure 3 also confirms that the overall level of flexicurity and the relative importance of 
flexibility and security show large disparities among the EU member states included here. In the 
ranking of countries according to the overall degree of flexicurity, in certain member states 
(Italy, Slovakia, Hungary, Ireland and the UK) flexibility clearly dominates, while in others 
(such as Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Denmark), the security aspects of flexicurity seem to prevail. 
Figure 3. The interim indicators for flexibility and security  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Figure 4 presents the same data in a scatterplot, which illustrates more clearly the balance 
between flexibility and security. The chart is divided into four squares: in the first are countries 
characterised by a low level of flexibility and security at the same time (both lower than 0.5/1). 
This panel is the most crowded and, surprisingly contains countries like Germany and France, 
where the welfare system has a long tradition and consolidated presence. The possible reason is 
that the concept of security translated into numbers in the flexicurity index is not limited to 
social assistance and embraces aspects of security that are still unknown in many countries, such 
as employment security. In France, for example, people expect the welfare state to guarantee the 
same job for life, whereas in Denmark the idea behind employment security is to increase the 
chances of finding a new job in case of dismissal. The few countries left are divided among the 
high flexibility and high security square (Sweden and Denmark) and the dominant flexibility 
square (Slovakia and Hungary). Finland, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland are border-line 
cases in this respect. 6 | ILARIA MASELLI 
Figure 4. Flexibility and security balance 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Even more informative is a further breakdown of the index. Radar charts compare the 
performances of each country for the four elements of flexicurity considered in the index: 
contractual flexibility, income security, employment security and training. The three radar 
charts organise countries in three groups according to their score in the overall index: high, poor 
and medium performers.  
High performers are those that score at least 0.6/1 and include, in order: Denmark, the UK, 
Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland. Incredibly, this group combines representative 
countries of the Nordic and of the Anglo-Saxon models. Nevertheless, one feature distinguishes 
them: all Nordic countries are characterised by a sort of equilibrium between the four measures, 
which is unknown in the UK and Ireland. The UK, indeed, registers a good score in all measures 
with the exception of ALMP: it has the lowest ‘per unemployed capita’ expenditure among the 
member states considered. Similarly, Ireland fares poorly on training. 
Figure 5. High performers 
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Poor performers score between 0.1 (Greece) and 0.3 (France, Spain and Portugal), with Italy 
and Luxembourg in between. The group is mainly composed of southern countries plus France, 
which, according to the Esping-Andersen categorisation of welfare regimes, is part-continental 
model, and Luxembourg. The comparison with the high performers makes it evident that all 
poor performers are very far from the four corners of the chart. With the exception of Italy and 
Greece, the only well developed tool concerns passive labour market policies; that is, the 
unemployment benefits system, meaning that limited attention is paid to activation and learning 
programmes and flexibility. The three remaining elements are relatively poorly developed, with 
the exception of ALMP in Luxembourg and France (scoring 0.4/1). Particularly interesting are 
the cases of Greece and Italy where welfare state powers in the field of labour market policies 
are restricted. Flexibility and security interim indicators for Italy indicate that the balance is in 
favour of the former (0.4/1) and that security aspects score only 0.1, whereas in Greece none of 
the aspects exceeds 0.2.  
Figure 6. Poor performers 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The third is the group of medium performers, which includes Continental Europe. A common 
feature is a lack of balance between old and new instruments of labour market policy: in Czech 
Republic, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the aspects of contractual 
flexibility and income security are more solid compared to training and activation. The only 
exception is Belgium, where the expenditure on ALMP is among the highest in Europe.  8 | ILARIA MASELLI 
Figure 7. Medium performers 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The comparison between input and outcome measures show that on average the performance of 
the outcome indicators is proportioned to the input. This is confirmed by elevating the degree of 
correlation between the two indexes (78%). There are nevertheless a few exceptions. For 
instance, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden show a slight underperformance indicating that 
better results could be achieved with existing institutions. In Spain, Greece and Czech Republic, 
outcome results are higher compared to the input, meaning that other institutions are in place to 
improve the performance of the labour market, in particular to ensure higher flexibility in Spain 
and Greece and to reduce the risk of poverty in Czech Republic.  
In short, it can be argued that the division of countries between poor, medium and high 
performers is coherent with the Esping-Andersen classification of welfare regimes, although 
with some surprises, such as the merge between Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries and the 
inclusion of Central Europe countries in the continental group. What is also interesting about the 
latter group is the ‘degree of persistence’ of the welfare system, which gives more or less space 
to passive policies but often resists the introduction of new tools.  
3.2  Flexicurity as a main determinant of employment performance 
To maximise its descriptive power, the index has also been used in a cross-section analysis as an 
explanatory variable of employment rates. The cross-section analysis proceeds in two steps: at a 
first stage flexibility and security interim indicators are used as regressors for employment rates. 
At a second stage, the flexicurity index is the only regressor. The main message from the first 
stage is that security is more powerful than flexibility as an explanatory variable. The second 
reveals that flexicurity is not simply the average of flexibility and security and that its impact is 
stronger on marginal groups.  
Table 2 summarises the coefficients of the first regression where flexibility, security and 
flexicurity are put in relation with employment rates broken down by age and gender. As far as 
flexibility is concerned, these are in line with the literature. The effects of employment 
protection legislation, indeed, have been extensively studied. In principle there are clear pros 
and cons in terms of its positive and negative effects on the labour market. Employment 
protection legislation is expected to raise labour costs and to create a cleavage between insiders 
(workers with stable contracts) and outsiders (unemployed or irregular workers) of the labour 
market. According to Saint-Paul (2002), indeed, employment protection legislation (EPL) is the BEYOND FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY | 9 
result of a sort of trade-off by incumbent workers for lower wages in exchange for greater 
employment protection. On the other hand, EPL will increase the incentives for the employer to 
invest in training, the loyalty of workers and their will to accept technological changes – all 
productivity boosters. EPL is also a shock absorber or a circuit-breaker in the current crisis (De 
Grauwe, 2009) and a tool to impede the discrimination of vulnerable groups like the elderly, 
women and disabled workers. Nevertheless, what the theory suggests is not always confirmed 
by empirical evidence. Previous econometric analysis evidenced that the EPL does: 
○  Increase the duration of unemployment spells and the share of long-term unemployment; 
○  Reduce the dynamism of the labour market by enlarging the share of workers with high job 
tenure and reducing labour turnover; 
○  Have a negative impact on female and youth employment rates. 
As far as security is concerned, regressions show that it is relevant in particular for two 
subgroups: young and older workers. A 10% increase in the indicator (for example from 0.4 to 
0.5) generates an increase in the employment rate of 3% for the former and of 2% for the latter. 
Security aspects also have an impact on female employment (2.5%), activity rates (almost 1.5%) 
and long-term unemployment (-4%).
4 
The result of the econometric analysis with the index as explanatory variable shows, as 
expected, a positive sign: flexicurity goes hand in hand with higher employment rates, meaning 
that it is successful in attracting people onto the labour market. A closer look also reveals that 
the magnitude of the relationship between employment rates and the flexicurity indicator varies 
according to the sub-group considered. It is less strong for core workers (aged 25-54), since for 
them a standard employment contract might actually exert a positive influence. But it doubles 
and triples for older and younger workers, respectively, confirming that a robust flexicurity 
system succeeds in attracting onto the labour market categories of workers that, for different 
reasons, have less access to jobs. One can therefore argue that, from this point of view, 
flexicurity helps to increase labour supply. In addition to employment rates, a high level of 
flexicurity is clearly associated with a low level of long-term unemployment: a 10% increase in 
the flexicurity index lowers the share of long-term unemployment (out of total unemployment) 
by 3.5%. In this case, however, the relationship with the security sub-indicator is even stronger 
(4.5%) confirming that active labour market policies play a major role in curbing long-term 
unemployment. 
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Figure 8. Flexicurity and employment rate (15-25 years) 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The coefficients of the regression provide additional interesting information: the average of the 
sub-indicators for flexibility and security does not produce the average of the regression 
coefficients; in other words, the relation between flexicurity and employment rates is clear and 
stronger than with flexibility and security taken separately. These findings provide numerical 
support to Bovenberg and Wilthagen (2008) who assert that “flexibility and security should not 
be seen as conflicting aspects of labour-market arrangements, but as mutually supportive 
components of a well-functioning labour market”. They reject the notion that flexibility is 
exclusively in the interests of employers while security is all that concerns workers, resulting in 
a sort of negotiated trade-off between the two. Consequently, flexicurity has to be more broadly 
interpreted as not simply the addition of flexibility and security, but as a system in which 
flexibility and security are intertwined. 
Table 2. Regression output for flexibility, security and flexicurity (based on input indicators) 
  Flexibility Security  Flexicurity  (input) 
 Coefficient  P-value  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Empl. rate 25-54  -0.570 0.794  12.976 0.000  11.002 0.008 
Empl. rate 15-64  6.230 0.012  15.741  0.001  20.91 0.000 
F Empl. rate  6.433 0.078  25.522  0.000  30.111  0.000 
Empl. rate 15-24  24.062 0.006  29.964 0.012  53.922 0.000 
Empl. rate 55-64  19.657 0.005  19.204 0.052  37.74  0.001 
Activity rate  4.716 0.186  14.020  0.009  18.51 0.000 
Long-term unempl.  -4.343 0.760  -37.850  0.002  -34.560  0.011 
Source: Own elaboration. 
When the income version is replaced with the outcome version, regressions produce very 
similar coefficients with, obviously, the same signs.  BEYOND FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY | 11 
Conclusions 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the empirical evidence resulting from the use of 
the index. First of all, it revealed that member states’ preferences for the balance between 
flexibility and security are highly diversified and cover all possible policy combinations. The 
recipe ‘low flexibility and low security’ prevails but there are also countries with both elements 
well developed (mostly the Nordic countries) and others with a stronger preference for 
flexibility (in Central Europe). Furthermore, radar charts helped to illustrate in which direction 
countries have to move to reach an economically and socially sustainable equilibrium. Medium 
performers, for instance, need to modernise their labour market policy by improving activation 
and training measures. Poor performers need to make huge effort to move in one of the 
flexicurity directions. Data analysed in the current Working Document provide support to the 
‘pathways’ approach proposed by the European Commission at the suggestion of the European 
Expert Group on Flexicurity. In a nutshell, they argue that starting positions and legal and 
contractual models are so diverse from country to country and so deep-rooted that they need to 
be taken into account when any policy transfer is proposed.   
A second important conclusion is that the idea of flexibility being in favour of employers and 
security being in favour of employees needs to be overcome. Flexicurity is ‘both for both’. 
However, a distinction needs to be made: the positive impact of flexicurity does not apply 
uniformly to all age groups but is two and three times stronger for older and younger workers 
respectively. This is important in the short and medium run because, on the one hand the 
younger group is the one more penalised by the crisis and, on the other, the older group is the 
one that imposes more challenges on the future sustainability of social systems, given the ageing 
of the population.  
Nevertheless, one cannot discuss the labour market without linking the reflection to the current 
situation. Therefore the question is: what is the link between the current crisis and flexicurity? It 
would be tempting to say that the latter is the solution to the former but this would be only 
partially true. It is true that where a flexicurity system is in place, people losing their jobs obtain 
financial help from the state and concrete support in finding a new job, but flexicurity will not 
solve the problem of the current fall in the demand for work. However, as supply strategy, it 
will contribute to speeding up the recovery by creating a sound and attractive labour market in 
which firms will be able to find the skills they require. Unfortunately there is one more link 
between flexicurity and the present recession: setting up such a system requires social 
investment. Denmark, for example, is the country with the highest total expenditure on labour 
market policies in Europe. This means that the probability of being able to finance the system is 
lower the higher the level of public debt.  
Finally, and importantly, if the analysis reveals the strength of the link between flexicurity and 
employment performance, one should not forget that other factors remain important, both in the 
short and the medium term, including: the level of education, the design and intensity of active 
labour market programmes, early retirement provisions and the influences on cost 
competitiveness. Flexicurity is therefore not a panacea but a key element in the broader panoply 
of labour market policies.  
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